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Abstract 
 
The recent Greek debt crisis highlighted the need for a robust fiscal policy regime. New Zealand's 
Public Finance Act 1989 establishes principles the government must take into account when setting its 
fiscal strategy, and imposes reporting requirements. These provisions are discussed, and analysed 
from the perspective of accountability theory. In particular, I use an accountability framework 
developed by Mark Bovens to consider the adequacy of six potential accountability forums. These 
forums are Parliament, the courts, the Treasury, the media, business groups, and the public via 
elections. It is concluded that each is relatively weak as a forum providing accountability for fiscal 
policy. Three possible amendments to New Zealand's fiscal responsibility regime are then considered. 
The first is to establish a new accountability forum: an independent fiscal commission, to provide fiscal 
reports and commentary. The second and third are amendments to the Act which may enhance existing 
accountability arrangements: a principle requiring consideration of intergenerational equity, and a 
fixed numerical target or limit for debt or spending. It is argued that the first two amendments should 
be adopted, while the last should not. This is primarily because a fixed target or limit would be bad 
policy. The paper concludes with further discussion of the related concept of transparency. It is argued 
that the Act is best viewed as an aide to transparency, rather than accountability, for fiscal policy. 
While Bovens' accountability framework is a useful exercise, the political and policy-focused nature of 
this area of the law makes rigid accountability inappropriate.  
 
 
Word length   
The text of this paper (excluding cover page, abstract, table of contents, footnotes 
and bibliography) comprises approximately 13,645 words.  
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 4 
I Introduction  
 
Recent media coverage of the Greek debt crisis has drawn mainstream global 
attention to potential consequences of long-term government irresponsibility. 
Governments in a mixed economy like New Zealand's provide a wide range of 
services to their citizens, from law enforcement to education. All the activities cost 
money, and governments must raise enough money to provide them, typically through 
taxation or borrowing or a combination of both. This is essentially what is meant by 
fiscal policy: the government's spending and revenue decisions. If, in a given year, a 
government spends less than it receives, it achieves a surplus. If it spends exactly 
what it receives, it achieves a balanced budget. And if it spends more than it receives, 
it has a deficit. Governments normally pay for deficits either by using existing 
savings, if they have any, or more commonly by borrowing. Borrowing has long-term 
implications because the government must eventually repay what it has borrowed, 
normally with interest. But borrowing is often politically advantageous because it 
avoids the need to raise taxes immediately. Citizens can be led to believe they can 
have it all: low taxes and extensive public services – thereby leaving the mess to a 
later government to deal with. This happened over several decades in Greece, where 
generous welfare and public services were provided largely through borrowing. The 
problem was exacerbated as recent governments were not transparent about the 
country's financial situation, so the extent of the problems became apparent only 
when a new Prime Minister took office in October 2009. The Greek government is 
now in a difficult financial situation, and in recent months has failed to make debt 
repayments that were due.1 
 
The Greek situation exemplifies the need for a strong fiscal responsibility regime. 
Another reason for having a firm approach to fiscal policy is that the political process 
is responsive to demands from special interest groups.2 The problem is exacerbated 
by future taxpayers being under-represented in the political system, so politicians are 
often "short-sighted or indifferent" to longer term budget constraints.3 
 
The fiscal responsibility provisions contained in part 2 of New Zealand's Public 
Finance Act 1989 aim to influence government behaviour by requiring it to be 
transparent about its fiscal policy, 4  and legislating principles to be followed. 
However, there is no legal sanction for breaching the provisions. This paper considers 
these provisions of the Act, and analyses their adequacy from a public law 
accountability perspective. It draws on existing scholarship, particularly an 
accountability framework proposed by Mark Bovens. Part II explains the provisions, 
including their background, the reasons behind them, and political commitment to 
them. Part III introduces accountability and Bovens' framework for assessing it. 
Bovens adopts a relatively narrow definition of accountability, essentially a process of 
'account giving', distinct from broader concepts like transparency. The strength of 
accountability arrangements can be assessed using three perspectives on                                                         
1 For further explanation, see Liz Alderman and others "Greece's Debt Crisis Explained" (20 August 
2015) New York Times <www.nytimes.com>. 
2 R Carling and S Kirchner Fiscal Rules for Limited Government: Reforming Australia's Fiscal 
Responsibility Legislation (Policy Monograph 98, Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney, 2009) at 2. 
3 At 2. 
4 Treasury Regulatory Impact Statement: Amendment to Part 2 of the Public Finance Act 1989 (the 
fiscal responsibility provisions) (28 March 2012). 
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accountability: democratic, constitutional and learning. Each perspective has its own 
assessment criteria. 
 
Part IV of the paper analyses the accountability for fiscal responsibility in New 
Zealand. It looks at six potential "accountability forums": Parliament, the courts, the 
Treasury, the media, business groups and the public at large via elections. It is 
concluded that each is somewhat weak as an accountability forum. Their common 
thread is a lack of formal sanctioning power. They may have the ability to impose 
political consequences, but this ability is limited. Part V then discusses three possible 
amendments to the Act, again primarily through an accountability lens. The first is 
whether an independent body or commission should be established to oversee fiscal 
policy and strategy. The second is whether there should be express reference in the 
legislation to intergenerational equity. The third is whether there should be a fixed 
target or limit to spending or borrowing. It is argued that the first two should be 
adopted, but the last should not, primarily on policy grounds. 
 
The paper concludes with a discussion of whether New Zealand's fiscal responsibility 
legislation is really best analysed using a formal accountability framework. It is 
argued that while formal accountability analysis is a meaningful assessment exercise, 
ultimately decisions around fiscal policy are ideological, policy-oriented and 
inherently political. Therefore the value of legislation regulating fiscal policy cannot 
be fully appreciated using formalistic frameworks such as Bovens'. The legislation is 
concerned not so much with controlling the government through enforceable 
requirements, as with setting specific criteria against which the government must 
decide its strategy and report to the public. It exists not to truly constrain the 
government, but to increase transparency. Accountability and transparency are 
different things, and in my view the Act is better thought of as an aide to the latter 
than the former. 
 
II Overview of the Fiscal Responsibility Provisions  
 
This part provides an overview of the fiscal responsibility provisions in the Public 
Finance Act 1989. It first sets out and explains the provisions themselves. It then 
provides an outline of their history. Lastly, it looks at the effects of the provisions, 
including political commitment to them. 
 
A The Provisions  
 
The fiscal responsibility provisions are contained in part 2 of the Act. At a high level 
they have three key aspects:5 first, they specify a set of principles for responsible 
fiscal management in the conduct of fiscal policy; secondly, they require regular 
public reporting by the government on the extent to which fiscal policy is consistent 
with those principles; and thirdly, they provide for regular and independent economic 
and fiscal updates by the Treasury, including a pre-election update and a statement on 
the long-term fiscal position at least every four years. The provisions require the 
                                                        
5 Treasury, above n 4, at 1. 
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government to set and pursue long-term fiscal objectives6 (10 years or longer) and 
short-term fiscal intentions7 (three years or longer). 
 
The provisions do not prescribe fiscal strategy, but rather require governments to be 
transparent about their objectives and intentions, whether they have changed, and how 
they accord with the "principles of responsible fiscal management".8 Those principles 
are:9 
(a) reducing debt to prudent levels by ensuring that, until those levels have been 
achieved, total operating expenses in each financial year are less than total operating 
revenues in that year; 
(b) maintaining prudent levels of debt by ensuring that, on average over a reasonable 
period of time, total operating expenses do not exceed total operating revenues; 
(c) achieving and maintaining adequate levels of total net worth; 
(d) managing prudently the fiscal risks facing the Government; 
(e) when formulating revenue strategy, having regard to efficiency and fairness, 
including the predictability and stability of tax rates; 
(f) when formulating fiscal strategy, having regard to the interaction between fiscal 
policy and monetary policy; 
(g) when formulating fiscal strategy, having regard to its likely impact on present 
and future generations; and 
(h) ensuring that the Crown's resources are managed effectively and efficiently. 
 
Key terms including "prudent" levels of debt and "reasonable period of time" are not 
defined in the Act, so are left open to the government to interpret. The government's 
fiscal strategy may depart from the principles of responsible fiscal management if:10 
(a) the departure from those principles is temporary; and 
(b) the Minister, in accordance with this Act, states— 
(i) the reasons for the departure from those principles; and 
(ii) the approach the Government intends to take to return to those principles; and 
(iii) the period of time that the Government expects to take to return to those 
principles. 
 
The government must present a fiscal strategy report each year to the House of 
Representatives.11 The report must state the government's long-term objectives and 
assess their accordance with the principles of responsible fiscal management. 12 It 
must also state the government's short-term intentions and assess their consistency 
with the principles. If the intentions are not consistent with the principles, the report 
must state: the reasons for the inconsistency; the approach the government intends to 
take to return to consistency; and the period of time expected to elapse before                                                         
6 Public Finance Act 1989, s 26J. 
7 Section 26K. 
8 Treasury, above n 4, at 1. See ss 26J and 26K. 
9 Paraphrased. See s 26G. 
10 Section 26G(2). 
11 Section 26I. 
12 Section 26J. 
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consistency is achieved. 13  The report must also address certain other matters 14  
including an assessment of the extent to which the government's recent fiscal 
performance is consistent with the government's fiscal strategy report for that 
period.15 No penalty is prescribed by the Act for failure to comply with any of the 
principles or reporting requirements. 
 
The Treasury in 2013 recommended the addition of further principles of responsible 
fiscal management that ultimately were not included in the Amendment Act. Notable 
was a principle that the government take into account economic cycles in formulating 
its fiscal strategy. Such an amendment would be good policy, and it is unclear why 
the recommendation was not acted on. However, its relevance to accountability is 
minimal, so it will not be discussed in this paper. 
 
B Background and History  
 
The fiscal responsibility provisions were intended to address high government debt by 
strengthening the incentives on Ministers to set budget priorities and follow an agreed 
fiscal strategy, and provide more regular information to the public on fiscal matters.16 
When introduced in 1994, the provisions were seen as world-leading and influential 
institutional reform. They have been cited as best practice by international agencies 
such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the 
International Monetary Fund.17 The original provisions were initially contained in a 
separate Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, and were incorporated into the Public 
Finance Act 1989 by the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004. Recently, additional 
provisions were added by the Public Finance (Fiscal Responsibility) Amendment Act 
2013, which came into force on 4 September that year. The long title of the 1994 Act 
was:18 
 
An Act to improve the conduct of fiscal policy by specifying principles of 
responsible fiscal management and by strengthening the reporting requirements of 
the Crown and, in particular, 
 
(a) By requiring the Minister of Finance to report regularly to the House of 
Representatives on the extent to which the Government's fiscal policy is consistent 
with the specified principles of responsible fiscal management and to justify in his or 
her report any departures made by the government from those principles. 
 
From the start Parliament's Finance and Expenditure Committee considered that 
transparency alone was insufficient to reduce government debt. It recommended the 
then-Bill be strengthened by the inclusion of legislated principles of responsible fiscal 
management, publication of a Budget Policy Statement, and providing for the Budget 
Policy Statement and other reports required under the Act to be referred to a 
parliamentary committee.19 According to the Treasury,20 the main objectives of a                                                         
13 Section 26K. 
14 Section 26L. 
15 Section 26L(1)(c). 
16 Treasury, above n 4, at 1. 
17 At 1. 
18 Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, long title. 
19 John Janssen "New Zealand's Fiscal Policy Framework: Experience and Evolution" (Treasury 
Working Paper 01/25, 2001) at 7–8. 
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robust fiscal responsibility regime are to ensure that governments take into account 
and publicly discuss all the relevant dimensions of fiscal policy. Fiscal policy can be 
thought of as having three dimensions: fiscal sustainability (maintaining prudent 
levels of debt), macroeconomic stability (fiscal decisions support rather than 
exacerbate economic cycles, such as recessions) 21  and fiscal structure (the 
composition of tax revenue and government expenses). 22 The fiscal responsibility 
provisions currently focus mainly on the first and third of those dimensions. The 
Treasury's recommendation that economic cycles be taken into account would have 
extended the Act to the second dimension. 
 
C Effects of the Provisions  
 
The political and practical consequences of the provisions are contentious. Early on, 
opposition politicians thought the legislation would be ineffectual because of its 
unenforceability. Winston Peters said "[l]egislation of this type in this country is 
meaningless unless this Parliament means to keep faith with the public". 23  Hon 
Michael Cullen, in my respectful view missing the mark, called it "constitutional 
nonsense" and suggested the "notion that this Parliament will somehow bind future 
Governments on fiscal policy by stating such matters as it must 'maintain a fiscal 
surplus in any year', is constitutional stupidity".24 Cullen later said "why should the 
present Government attempt to constrain the sovereignty of voter choice, when they 
may choose to vote for large deficits?"25 Paul Swain opined, "[i]t is neither possible 
nor desirable for this Government to try legislatively to 'strait-jacket in' policy 
directions in the area of fiscal policy for future Governments."26 
 
On the other hand there was a view that the Act would become politically entrenched, 
and that governments could be expected to comply with its provisions even if they are 
not enforceable in the courts.27 That a National government created the legislation and 
a Labour government consolidated it with the Public Finance Act is evidence of 
widespread political commitment to the provisions, and that they have become 
politically entrenched.28 More recent evidence supporting this is that the National 
government in 2013 added additional principles. When introducing the changes, Hon 
Bill English acknowledged a constitutional aspect to the provisions. He said, "[g]iven 
the constitutional significance of the fiscal responsibility provisions, it was important 
that we discussed the changes with other parliamentary parties before introducing 
them to Parliament".29 A contrasting effect is that the consolidation of the principles 
into the Public Finance Act has made them "less visible".30 Less visible principles 
                                                                                                                                                              
20 Treasury, above n 4, at 8. 
21 Recessions have a precise economic definition, but generally speaking are contractions in the 
economy. Common effects include reduced income and increased unemployment. 
22 Treasury, above n 4, at 3. 
23 (7 June 1994) 540 NZPD 1490. 
24 (26 May 1994) 540 NZPD 1143. 
25 (22 June 1994) 541 NZPD 2009. 
26 (7 June 1994) 540 NZPD 1483. 
27 Chye-Ching Huang "The Repeal and Resurrection of 'Responsibility'" (2005) 11 Auckland 
University Law Review 230 at 235. 
28 At 234–235. 
29 Bill English "Improvements to Public Finance Introduced" (press release, 30 August 2012). 
30 Huang, above n 27, at 235. 
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may be less likely to constrain executive policy and be more vulnerable to amendment 
or repeal.31 To date, no principles have been repealed or watered down. 
 
Have the provisions had any effect? New Zealand's fiscal position improved 
significantly in the first half of the 1990s, before the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 
came into force. This was largely due to reduced expenses during an economic 
upswing, and lower finance costs from falling interest rates.32 A rise in the age of 
superannuation eligibility also contributed to the improvement.33 Government debt 
continued to fall during the rest of the 1990s, though at a lesser rate, and kept falling 
modestly until the global financial crisis occurred in 2008. 34  New Zealand had 
relatively low government debt at the time of the crisis and domestic recession 
beginning in 2008.35 New Zealand's government debt at the time was below 20 per 
cent of gross domestic product (GDP). 36  Many countries, including the United 
Kingdom and the United States, had government debt exceeding 50 per cent of their 
respective GDP. In other words, New Zealand's government debt, relative to the size 
of its economy, was small compared with similar countries. This indicates that New 
Zealand's successive governments were very fiscally responsible in the 1990s and 
early 2000s. 
 
However, whether the provisions have really made a difference is unclear. New 
Zealand has maintained debt levels that are low by international standards, and much 
lower than in the decades preceding the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. 
But no research has firmly attributed this to governments' commitment to the 
principles of responsible fiscal management in the Act. It might simply have been that 
recent governments prioritised fiscal restraint for reasons unrelated to the legislation's 
requirements. 
 
III Accountability  
 
This part of the paper discusses what accountability is, and explains the framework 
that will be used to analyse the Public Finance Act in the next section. 
 
Accountability is "one of those golden concepts that no one can be against. It is 
increasingly used in political discourse and policy documents because it conveys an 
image of transparency and trustworthiness."37 Modern representative democracy can 
be analysed as a series of principal-agent relations. Citizens, the primary principals in 
a democracy, transfer their sovereignty to political representatives who, in turn (at 
least in parliamentary systems) confide their trust in a cabinet. 38 Accountability's 
place in a democracy has been put thus: "[d]elegation involves endowing another 
party with the discretion to act, representation is about the interests that are at stake, 
and accountability is meant to ensure that the exercise of discretion is checked. Each                                                         
31 Huang, above n 27, at 235–236. 
32 Janssen, above n 19, at 15. 
33 At 15. 
34 Treasury Briefing to the Finance and Expenditure Committee (February 2013). 
35 Treasury, above n 4, at 3. 
36 At 4. 
37 Mark Bovens "Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework" (2007) 13 Euro 
LJ 447 at 448. 
38 Mark Bovens "Public Accountability" in Ewan Ferlie, Laurence E Lynn Jr and Christopher Pollitt 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Public Management (OUP, Oxford, 2009) at 192. 
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in their own way, these three mechanisms are meant to ensure that in the end the 
preferences of the polity are translated into policy".39 The accountability framework 
used in the next section's analysis of the six accountability forums will now be 
discussed. 
 
Bovens states that accountability "has come to stand as a general term for any 
mechanism that makes powerful institutions responsive to their particular publics".40 
It can be thought of by either broad or narrow conceptions. Broad conceptions may 
have dimensions including transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility and 
responsiveness. 41  However, this broadness makes it hard to establish empirically 
whether an organisation is subject to accountability. 42 Bovens prefers a narrower 
sense that refers to concrete practices of account giving. He defines accountability as 
"a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to 
explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgement, and the actor may face consequences."43 There is some contention over 
whether a sanction is a constitutive element of accountability.44 Bovens considers that 
it is and should be included in the definition, but in the broader sense of 
"consequences". These consequences would include political and reputational 
consequences, rather than strictly formal or legal sanctions. 45  The possibility of 
consequences "makes the difference between the non-committal provision of 
information and being held to account."46 Weale argues that "[t]he most obvious 
example of such sanctions within democracies is elections".47 Elections provide "an 
incentive for those seeking office to explain what they will do with political power if 
they succeed in achieving it, and an incentive for those who have held office 
retrospectively to justify their use of political power".48 An election "forces rival 
candidates to campaign against one another in such a way that there is accountability 
to the electorate."49 
 
Brandsma and Schillemans, naming their framework the "accountability cube", 
similarly but more simply state that accountability has three phases.50 The first is the 
information phase. Here the actor provides an account of his or her conduct to the 
accountability forum, for example providing reports and oral testimony. The second is 
the discussion phase. The forum assesses the account and may ask for additional 
information and pose follow-up questions. The actor may respond and clarify his or 
her actions. The third is the consequences phase. Here the forum passes judgment and 
imposes sanctions to correct or reward the actor if necessary. Sanctions may be 
formal or informal (such as public praise or criticism), and positive or negative. The                                                         
39 Gijs Jan Brandsma and Thomas Schillemans "The Accountability Cube: Measuring Accountability" 
(2012) 23 Jnl of Public Admin Research and Theory 953 at 953. 
40 Bovens, above n 37, at 450. 
41 At 450. 
42 At 450. 
43 At 450. 
44 See discussion in Bovens, above n 37, at 451. 
45 At 451–452. 
46 At 451. 
47 Albert Weale "New Modes of Governance, Political Accountability and Public Reason" (2010) 46 
Government and Opposition 58 at 65. 
48 At 65. 
49 At 65. 
50 Brandsma and Schillemans, above n 39, at 955–956. 
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extent to which accountability exists can be assessed by considering the level of 
information provided, the intensity of discussions, and the reach of sanctions.51 In 
practice this is similar to Bovens' framework, but it is outlined here as an alternative 
way of thinking about accountability. As for consequences, Brandsma and 
Schillemans argue that what matters is not the ease by which a principal may resort to 
actually imposing consequences, but simply whether he or she has the possibility.52 
 
It is important to understand what accountability is not. Bovens considers 
transparency an important prerequisite for accountability. But it does not in itself 
constitute accountability due to a lack of scrutiny by a specific forum.53 Transparency 
is discussed later in this paper. Similarly, responsiveness (of the actor to the needs and 
preferences of a range of stakeholders) and participation (of those stakeholders in the 
process) are not accountability. Accountability is retrospective – actors are required to 
account to a forum after the fact. Responsiveness and participation may enhance 
political legitimacy, but are not accountability because they lack the elements of 
justification, judgment and consequences. 54  Control also is broader than 
accountability, although there may be a fine line between the two.55 
 
The key question for the assessment of accountability is what the effects of the 
various types of accountability are and how to judge them. 56  Inadequacies in 
accountability can be either deficits – a lack of accountability arrangements – or 
excesses – a dysfunctional accumulation of a range of accountability mechanisms.57 
 
Three reasons are commonly given for the value of accountability, and each offers a 
separate perspective for the assessment of accountability relations.58 The first is the 
democratic perspective, that public accountability is important in a democracy 
because it helps citizens to control public office-holders. Accountability provides the 
voters with the information needed for judging the propriety and effectiveness of the 
government's conduct. 59  The second is the constitutional perspective, that 
accountability prevents corruption and the abuse of power by tyrannical 
governments.60 The third is the learning perspective, that accountability is a tool to 
make and keep governments, agencies and officials effective in delivering on their 
promises. The prospect of sanctions motivates them to find better ways of doing 
things. 61  These three perspectives provide systematic criteria to evaluate 
accountability arrangements. Key types of accountability recognised by Bovens 
include legal accountability (involving the courts), 62  political accountability 
                                                        
51 Brandsman and Schillemans, above n 39, at 960. 
52 At 968. 
53 Bovens, above n 37, at 453. 
54 At 453. 
55 At 453–454. 
56 At 462. 
57 At 462. 
58 At 462. 
59 At 463. 
60 At 463. 
61 At 463–464. 
62 At 456. 
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(involving ministers, Parliament and ultimately the public)63 and social accountability 
(involving, for example, interest groups and non-governmental organisations).64 
 
A Summary of Accountability  
 
Bovens argues for a narrow definition of accountability. The key components of such 
an accountability relationship are that the actor has an obligation to explain and to 
justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the 
actor may face consequences. Once an accountability relationship exists, three 
perspectives provide criteria for assessing the extent of the accountability. These are 
called the democratic, constitutional and learning perspectives. These perspectives 
will be elaborated on in the following discussion of accountability forums. 
 
IV Accountability and the Public Finance Act  
 
The Public Finance Act can be analysed using accountability frameworks. The focus 
in this paper is that developed by Bovens, because it is a comprehensive framework 
that has been widely cited and accepted. But the work of others will also be 
considered when appropriate. Two conceptually distinct approaches can be taken. The 
first is to look at the effectiveness of the accountability forums in holding the Minister 
to account for complying with the Act – in other words, how effective they are in 
enforcing the Act. The second is to look at how the Act contributes to each forum's 
effectiveness in holding the Minister to account for fiscal responsibility more 
generally – that is, whether the Act enhances their existing effectiveness. Each 
approach is in one sense wider and another sense narrower than the other. Although 
distinct, both approaches are appropriate to the subject of this paper and thus both will 
be used. Their distinction is outlined here for clarity. 
 
Six accountability forums are considered: Parliament, the courts, the Treasury, the 
media, business groups, and the public through elections. It is argued that each forum 
provides relatively weak accountability using Bovens' framework. It is also noted that 
the forums are interdependent: the media communicates the work of the other forums 
to the public; elections are the ultimate means by which political consequences are 
imposed. It is worth noting now that an actor, namely the government or in some 
cases the Minister of Finance, is present in each accountability forum below. 
 
A Parliament  
 
Parliament is an important intermediary between the government and the public, and 
can engage in accountability dialogue with the executive.65 It loosely meets Bovens' 
definition of an accountability relationship, particularly once Parliamentary select 
committees are taken into account. By convention, ministers are answerable to 
Parliament and must explain all matters affecting their portfolios.66 The government's 
fiscal strategy report must be tabled in Parliament. The Finance and Expenditure                                                         
63 Bovens, above n 37, at 455. 
64 At 457. 
65 Auditor-General Third report for 1999: The accountability of Executive Government to Parliament 
(1999) at 15–16. 
66 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2014) at 244. 
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Committee considers government economic and financial matters, including the 
reports required by the Public Finance Act. One of its primary functions is to examine 
the government's fiscal policy objectives against the principles in the Act. 67 The 
Committee has various powers including requesting ministers, or anyone else, to give 
evidence and be examined.68 If a person refuses, the chair of the Committee can apply 
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to issue a summons.69 There is no 
specific debate in the House on the report or the government's fiscal strategy it 
contains. But there is typically a lot of general discussion of government financial 
matters. There is significant debate on the Appropriations Estimates Bill, the 
legislation component of the Budget, during the legislative process. The Minister 
clearly has the opportunity to explain and justify the government's fiscal decisions, 
and opposition Members of Parliament (MPs) can give speeches in criticism. In 
addition, there is Parliament's question time, in which opposition and government 
backbench MPs can ask ministers questions and receive responses. 
 
Political consequences may result from all this. However, Parliamentary debates and 
questions on matters that involve ideology, such as economic and fiscal policy, are 
often directed at political point-scoring rather than serious consideration of the issues. 
It is questionable how seriously such discussion is taken by the public. And it is 
questionable whether any political consequences to the Minister or government can 
actually be attributed to compliance with the Public Finance Act or fiscal 
responsibility in general. Consequences might simply arise because of a poor oral 
performance in the House by the Minister. On a formal level, Parliament can control 
the executive because it 'controls the purse strings': it examines and approves by 
statute the revenue and expenditure proposals of the Government (that is, the 
Budget). 70  Further, many government policies must be passed by Parliament in 
legislation. This in theory gives it significant power over fiscal policy, both directly 
(budgets must be passed by Parliament) and indirectly (as a political bargaining chip). 
In practice, however, the government's majority in Parliament places major limits on 
Parliament's control over the executive. So when it comes to matters like the Public 
Finance Act, Parliament may have only softer political tools and rhetoric to control 
the executive. It has been suggested that New Zealand's mixed member proportional 
electoral system does limit the government and ensure greater separation of powers, 
so "widely unpopular policies cannot be rushed through".71 This may place limits on 
the government in extreme circumstances. But fiscal policy is foundational 
government policy supported by minor parties in coalition or confidence and supply 
agreements. Therefore the fiscal policy would have to be so extreme as to break the 
government before Parliament could prevent its passage. Ministers are appointed by 
the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister; 72  Parliament has no 
involvement in the appointment process and has no removal powers as legislatures in 
some countries have. In extreme situations, a Minister who deceives or misleads 
Parliament over any portfolio responsibilities breaches the convention of individual 
ministerial responsibility and may be charged with contempt of Parliament.73 But                                                         
67 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2011, SOs 127, 330–331. 
68 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2011, SO 192. 
69 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2011, SO 194. 
70 Auditor-General, above n 65, at 26. 
71 Mai Chen Public Law Toolbox (2nd ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2014) at 28. 
72 By constitutional convention. See Joseph, above n 76, at 237–238. 
73 At 244. 
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Parliament would still have no removal powers and could only put pressure on the 
Minister to resign. Thus Parliament has a lack of formal sanctioning power. 
 
Parliament could perform well from the democratic perspective, in which the key 
question is whether the accountability arrangement adds to the possibilities open to 
the voter, parliament or other representative bodies to control executive power.74 
From this perspective, Parliament helps highlight information in the reports that are 
mandated by the Public Finance Act. MPs can also request further information from 
the Minister, which may be brought to the public. As a representative body made up 
of elected (either directly or via party lists) members, its ability to question the 
Minister is important as MPs are the public's elected representatives. The fusion in the 
Westminster system of the legislature and executive somewhat diminishes this in 
practice. But nonetheless the ability of opposition MPs to ask questions does mean the 
government can be held to account by other elected members. Again, however, the 
discussion is so partisan and the potential political consequences so hard to isolate 
that it is questionable whether Parliament provides sufficient incentives for the 
government to commit itself to the agenda of its democratically legitimised principals. 
Ministers are also democratically elected members of the legislature, so in principle 
are as responsive and accessible to the public as other MPs are. This contrasts with 
the more rigid separation of powers systems in some other countries in which 
ministers are unelected, resulting in a greater distinction between elected 
representatives (members of the legislature) and the executive. 
 
Also relevant is the constitutional perspective, in which the fundamental questions are 
whether the accountability arrangement offers enough incentives, including sanctions, 
for public officials and agencies to refrain from the abuse of authority, and whether 
the accountability forum has enough inquisitive powers to reveal corruption or 
mismanagement. Parliament maintains continuous oversight of the Government's 
fiscal activities through reports, Parliamentary questions, debates and select 
committees, and through the Controller and Auditor-General. 75  The Select 
Committee, as already noted, can call and examine the Minister. The political 
consequences of Parliament's process may act as an incentive on the Minister to 
comply with the Act, although this is questionable as already discussed. Other 
weaknesses from a constitutional perspective are those discussed above. Parliament 
does not have the power to remove a minister from office. And the focus of 
Parliamentary interaction is generally aimed at making political gain, rather than on 
conformity of actions with laws and norms. From a learning perspective, the overall 
question is whether the arrangement enhances the learning capacity and effectiveness 
of the public administration. 76 Parliament contributes little from this perspective, 
other than to potentially highlight weaknesses with fiscal strategy. 
 
On the point about a lack of serious debate, here are some examples of typical 
parliamentary discussion on fiscal and economic issues. They provide some indication 
of the level of debate and the extent to which Parliament really holds the government 
to account for fiscal responsibility. Opposition MP Chris Hipkins criticised the 
government by saying, "I should remind people, [Labour] produced nine surpluses in                                                         
74 Bovens, above n 37, at 465. 
75 Auditor-General, above n 65, at 26. 
76 Bovens, above n 37, at 466. 
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a row to National's seven deficits".77 Chris Bishop defended the government's policies 
by saying, "Labour members have absolutely no fiscal credibility whatsoever … they 
should be apologising to New Zealanders for [their past fiscal decisions]." Minister 
Nick Smith said, "Members on this side know the definition of good fiscal 
management". There have been some higher quality questions and answers. For 
example, David Bennett said, "when you look at a Budget surplus or deficit—in this 
case, we are looking at losses of about $684 million in 2014-15, followed by a surplus 
of $176 million in 2015-16, and increasing surpluses after that—it shows that New 
Zealand is on the right track. It shows that the economic management of this 
Government is on the right track". Notably, he had also previously referred to 
Treasury reports. Green MP Jan Logie said, "the tax cuts that this Government 
introduced have cost this country $5 billion over the last term of Parliament. The $61 
billion of debt that this Government has got the country into—up from $14 billion—
has now meant that we are paying $1 billion a year in interest off that debt."78 
However, substantively good speeches seem to be in the minority as many are purely 
political. 
 
The Finance and Expenditure Committee works behind the scenes. It must release 
reports which consider, among other things, the government's Fiscal Strategy.79 This 
in theory is a good opportunity to closely analyse the strategy, but in practice is not 
done. Recent reports have done little more than summarise the key points of the 
strategy, without critical examination.80 
 
To summarise, Parliament does meet Bovens' definition of an accountability forum. 
The democratic perspective is especially relevant, and Parliament has the potential to 
perform well from this perspective. The constitutional perspective is also relevant. 
But Parliament in practice is reasonably weak in both perspectives, primarily because 
the standard of debate and criticism is low. It is therefore questionable whether 
political consequences would follow. But are these weaknesses a serious problem 
with the forum? They are probably just a reflection of the inherently political nature 
of fiscal policy and that Parliament is not the best place for precise and neutral 
analysis of the government's actions. Parliament is the battleground of opposing sides, 
and its main strength is in giving the public both sides of the picture from which to 
decide. Nonetheless, when using Bovens' framework it is difficult to conclude that 
Parliament is anything other than a relatively weak accountability forum. 
 
B The Courts  
 
The first issue to consider here is whether the courts will actually engage with the 
Public Finance Act. Judicial review is the primary means of calling the executive to 
account.81 Some language that was formerly non-justiciable82 has now been held to be 
justiciable. An example is certain "aspirational"83 provisions in s 9 of the State Owned                                                         
77 (21 May 2015) 705 NZPD 3789. 
78 (15 May 2014) 698 NZPD 17931. 
79 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2011, SO 327. 
80 For example see Finance and Expenditure Committee 2015/16 Estimates for Vote Finance, Fiscal 
Strategy Report 2015, and Budget Economic and Fiscal Update 2015 (2 July 2015). 
81 Janet McLean "New Public Management New Zealand Style" in Paul Craig and Adam Tomkins 
(eds) The Executive and Public Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) at 142. 
82 Justiciability refers to the capability of being determined by the courts. 
83 McLean, above n 81, at 142–143. 
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Enterprises Act 1986, at issue in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General.84 
Nonetheless, not all legislation is justiciable, and in any event, remedies in judicial 
review are discretionary.85 
 
In one sense the Public Finance Act is a type of legal accountability because it 
imposes legal requirements on the government. However, if it cannot be legally 
enforced it is difficult to call it legal accountability in substance. As already noted, the 
Act does not prescribe any specific penalties for breaching the fiscal responsibility 
provisions. Huang, discussing the predecessor Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, 
identifies three reasons why the provisions may not be enforced by the courts at all. 
This type of legislation is sometimes called "responsibility" legislation.86 
 
First, justiciability principles may limit judicial enforcement, because courts have 
decided they do not have the capability to decide on some matters, including matters 
of "high policy". This does not apply in every situation with an element of policy, nor 
does it require a decision-maker to take account of competing relevant 
considerations. 87  It could be argued that the "high policy" doctrine should be 
interpreted narrowly. The argument is that the doctrine should be reserved for cases 
where the subject-matter of a decision is such that it should be made only by elected 
officials, and be subject to accountability via the democratic process rather than the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the court.88 
 
Even with a more restricted interpretation, the doctrine raises a problem for the Act. 
Fiscal policy is so central to the operating of government (and the economy) and is so 
'high level' rather than operational that it should be only the government that sets it. If 
this is correct, then if, for example, a court were required to decide whether the 
government had reduced its debt to "prudent" levels, as required the Act, it arguably 
would have to assess high policy.89 Issues might also arise if the court had to consider 
whether budgets were balanced over a "reasonable period of time" or whether the 
government has adequately had regard to the interaction between monetary and fiscal 
policy. The latter is a technical economic question on which views may differ.90 As 
noted already, the Act does not define or provide guidance on a number of key terms 
in the legislation. Courts also may refuse relief that would not be in the public 
interest, and there are wide areas of public decision-making in which political 
judgment of the public interest must prevail. 91  Joseph describes it as a court's 
reluctance to involve itself in national political or policy considerations. 92 Fiscal 
policy is arguably such an area, because it does involve wider economic and social 
wellbeing considerations. The Supreme Court recently said the courts should be very 
reluctant to make "an examination of general government policies, priorities and                                                         
84 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641. 
85 McLean, above n 81, at 151. 
86 Responsibility statutes typically require the executive to prepare and publish reports, but lack explicit 
judicial enforcement and remedial provisions. See Huang, above n 27, for further discussion. 
87 See Waitakere City Council v Lovelock [1997] 2 NZLR 385. 
88 Chen, above n 71, at 861. 
89 Huang, above n 27, at 232. 
90 Monetary policy concerns the country's money supply, and primarily seeks to influence interest rates 
and inflation. Fiscal policy – government spending and taxation – has side-effects on interest rates and 
inflation, so there can be tension between the two policy types. 
91 Laws of New Zealand Administrative Law (online ed) at [159]. 
92 Joseph, above n 66, at 874–876. 
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funding decisions".93 This would not be such a problem with respect to the very 
publication of the mandated reports – if the Minister failed to present a particular 
report, presumably the courts would have no difficulty saying so. But there may still 
be issues with determining the adequacy of the reports' content. The reports' substance 
is more important than their titles, so little would be gained by the courts reviewing 
whether a report has been published if they do not consider its substance. 
 
Secondly, there may be no one who has legal standing to bring an action against the 
government. The duties imposed on the government in statutes like this are arguably 
for the general public benefit, and may not be owed to any particular person or group 
who can ask the courts to enforce the duties.94 To have standing, a person must have a 
sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates; 95  someone who 
suffers in no appreciable way will lack standing to proceed.96 Courts have in recent 
decades adopted a relatively liberal approach to standing, particularly in what is often 
called "public interest litigation". Nonetheless, it is difficult to apply their reasoning 
to the Public Finance Act. The Court of Appeal has endorsed97 dicta of Lord Diplock 
in Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small 
Businesses Ltd. Agreeing with Lord Denning in a prior case, Lord Diplock said "if 
there is good ground for supposing that a government department or a public authority 
is transgressing the law, or is about to transgress it, in a way which offends or injures 
thousands of Her Majesty's subjects, then any one of those offended or injured can 
draw it to the attention of the courts of law and seek to have the law enforced".98 It is 
a stretch to say that any particular fiscal strategy would offend or injure the public, 
because even severe fiscal irresponsibility normally must continue for years or 
decades before its consequences become problematic. For instance, the Greek 
government has run a deficit every year since 1974 but its debt crisis arose only in the 
last few years. Further, the long-term harm typically arises due to short-term benefit – 
deficits occur because government spending is greater than revenue, so the public is 
essentially receiving more from the government than it is putting in. If a fiscal 
strategy has significant immediate advantages it might be difficult to argue it is 
harmful to the public. 
 
Lord Diplock then said "[t]he reference here is to flagrant and serious breaches of the 
law by persons and authorities exercising governmental functions which are 
continuing unchecked"99 and "[i]t would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system 
of public law if a pressure group … or even a single public spirited taxpayer, were 
prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi100 from bringing the matter to 
the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct 
stopped."101 He lastly said "[i]t is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that 
judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is                                                         
93 Couch v Attorney General (No 2) [2010] NZSC 27, [2010] 3 NZLR 149 at [161]. 
94 Huang, above n 27, at 232. 
95 Laws of New Zealand Administrative Law (online ed) at [153]. 
96 See Joseph, above n 66, at 1225. 
97 Environmental Defence Society Inc v South Pacific Aluminium Ltd (No 3) [1981] 1 NZLR 216. 
98 Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd 
[1982] AC 617 (HL) at 641, citing Blackburn v Greater London Council [1976] 3 All ER 184 (CA) at 
192. 
99 Inland Revenue Commissioners, above n 98, at 641. 
100 The right to bring an action in court. 
101 Inland Revenue Commissioners, above n 98, at 644. 
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unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they 
carry out their functions… they are responsible to a court of justice for the lawfulness 
of what they do, and of that the court is the only judge."102 On these points, it is 
highly unlikely that any fiscal strategy will be a "flagrant and serious" breach, or that 
the government is acting unchecked, given that its budget must be passed by 
Parliament every year. Thus it might be a "sufficient answer" in this situation to say 
the central government is accountable to Parliament for the way it carries out its 
functions. 
 
Thirdly, judges might conclude that Parliament did not intend them to enforce the 
legislation. 103 The statute lacks explicit judicial enforcement and remedial provisions. 
The then-Bill's promoters did not mention judicial enforcement, instead explaining 
they intended political pressure to enforce the duties.104 The courts might determine 
that Parliament intended the statute to be a "blueprint for the behaviour of political 
actors, to be enforced by those actors amongst themselves using political processes 
inside and outside the House." 105  Consequently, for these reasons the courts are 
unlikely to get involved in the Public Finance Act and matters of fiscal responsibility. 
Thus the courts do not meet Bovens' definition of accountability. 
 
Hypothetically, if the courts were to get involved then they would likely meet Bovens' 
definition, subject to cross-examination issues discussed below. There would be an 
actor (the Minister), a forum (the court) in which the actor is obliged to explain and 
justify his or her conduct, the forum may pose questions and pass judgment, and the 
actor may face consequences. Those consequences would most likely be political, 
because the Act contains no penalties and judicial review is concerned with process 
rather than outcome. The government would likely be instructed simply to reconsider 
its decision. 
 
Bovens' perspective most relevant to the courts is the constitutional perspective. 
Courts would be good from this perspective if they grant leave requiring Ministers 
and other individuals to be cross-examined. Doing so would give the Minister an 
opportunity to explain the government's decision, and be questioned on it. However, 
granting leave for cross-examination has a high threshold: it must be shown that 
cross-examination is "necessary", rather than just of assistance.106 Leave will not be 
granted where an applicant seeks to engage in a "fishing expedition". 107 So it is 
questionable whether the Minister would be cross-examined. In any event, the 
political embarrassment of having major economic policy judicially reviewed, as well 
as the consumption of time and other resources involved in judicial review, may 
provide a strong incentive for the government to comply with the legislation's 
requirements. Another strong point is that courts do focus their interaction on 
conformity of the executive's actions with the law, which Bovens considers a criterion 
for the constitutional perspective.108                                                         
102 Inland Revenue Commissioners, above n 98, at 644. 
103 Huang, above n 27, at 232. 
104 At 232. 
105 At 232. 
106 Commerce Commission v Powerco Ltd CA123/06, 9 November 2006 at [38]. 
107 Joseph, above n 66, at 933. 
108  Mark Bovens, Thomas Schillemans and Paul 'T Hart "Does Public Accountability Work? An 
Assessment Tool" (2008) 86 Public Administration 225 at 231. 
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There would be little positive effect from the learning perspective, except to highlight 
failure to comply with the legislation. In fact there may even be a negative effect if 
the prospect of judicial review leads to a proceduralism and rules-based approach that 
hampers the making of decisions which are good from a policy standpoint – policy 
being a key role of the executive branch. 
 
Courts would score poorly from a democratic perspective, because the purpose of 
judicial review is not to gather information for the public but rather to assess process. 
Moreover, it is an unelected judiciary inquiring into the workings of an elected 
executive branch which in principle exercises popular sovereignty. Bovens 
acknowledges that accountability arrangements may score well from one perspective 
but not from others, making the evaluation of accountability arrangements a 
"somewhat equivocal exercise". Further, the perspectives may not always point in the 
same direction.109 The courts present a situation where this conflict occurs. 
 
Regardless of whether courts were to engage in judicial review, Huang argues the 
legislation may still have some indirect legal effect: "[a]ll Acts of Parliament must fit 
into the body of law as a whole",110 so when interpreting one piece of legislation, 
judges can consider other legislation. Responsibility legislation can help judges 
interpret other statutes that use similar terms or address similar areas of law. It can 
also shape the judicial views of New Zealand's constitutional structure, and can affect 
the development of the common law.111 For example, in Lange v Atkinson the Court 
of Appeal decided to develop the defamation defence of qualified privilege in a way 
that was consistent with the constitutional principles the Court had articulated.112 It is 
not clear when and how this would likely happen in relation to the Public Finance 
Act, but it is something to bear in mind. 
 
There are also good policy reasons why legislation of this kind should not be legally 
enforceable. It belongs to an area of the law and government policy that requires 
scope for significant political and economic judgment. Budget deficits are regarded 
by many economists as an important, or even essential, short-term tool to help a 
country recover from a recession.113 Further, economic policy is highly ideological 
and it is important in a parliamentary democracy such as New Zealand's that popular 
sovereignty be exercisable on such a matter. 
 
To summarise, the courts are unlikely to consider the fiscal responsibility provisions 
of the Public Finance Act. Therefore Bovens' definition of an accountability forum is 
not met. If the courts were to consider it, they might be a good accountability forum 
from the constitutional perspective. They would be independent, and focused on 
compliance with the law, rather than scoring political points. Even so, it is unlikely 
the Minister would be cross-examined. This would reduce the courts' effectiveness. 
The Act contains no express legal remedial provisions, and judicial review is                                                         
109 Bovens, above n 37, at 466. 
110 JF Burrows Statute Law in New Zealand (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2003) at 168 in Huang, 
above n 31, at 233. 
111 Huang, above n 27, at 233. 
112 Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424, discussed in Huang, above n 26, at 233. 
113 The Keynesian school of economic thought. See Sarwat Jahan, Ahmed Saber Mahmud and Chris 
Papageorgiou "What is Keynesian Economics?" (2014) 51(3) Finance & Development 53 at 53–54. 
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concerned with process. Therefore, consequences from court action would likely be 
political, rather than legal. This is good from a policy perspective, as fiscal policy is 
ideological and requires political and economic judgment. But it does mean the courts 
are at most a fairly weak accountability forum. 
 
C The Treasury  
 
The Public Finance Act requires the Treasury to prepare several reports to then be 
presented by the Minister of Finance, including a statement on the country's long-term 
fiscal position and an economic and fiscal update. Another key report presented by 
the Minister, the fiscal strategy report, does not need to be prepared by the Treasury. 
But in practice it is because the Treasury is the organisation that works with the 
report's subject-matter. All reports are publicly available on the Treasury's website, 
and some are also available on the separate Budget website. It is unclear how 
independent the Treasury is in preparing the reports, and how much influence the 
Minister has over them, if any. 
 
The Treasury does not meet Bovens' definition of an accountability forum. It is under 
the direction of the Minister of Finance, so is not institutionally independent, even if it 
may exercise independence on some matters. In a sense this is an accountability 
relationship of the opposite kind – the Treasury is accountable to the Minister, rather 
than vice versa. It cannot impose sanctions on the Minister, but the reports it issues 
could lead to political consequences. The Treasury's value in relation to the Public 
Finance Act might be characterised as a contribution to fiscal transparency, rather 
than accountability. 
 
Could the Treasury nonetheless be effective as an accountability forum? Its reports 
publicly provide important fiscal and economic information, thus improving the 
ability of the public and Parliament to make informed decisions and exercise 
democratic control. It could therefore be good from the democratic perspective. 
Unfortunately the latest fiscal strategy report114 arguably does not comply with the 
legislation's requirements. Sections 26J and 26K of the Act require the report to 
"assess the consistency" of the government's long-term objectives and short-term 
intentions with the principles of responsible fiscal management. In the context of the 
written report, this implies the objectives and intentions should be evaluated against 
each principle. However, the report merely lists the government's fiscal objectives and 
intentions and asserts that "[t]hese short-term intentions and long-term objectives are 
consistent with each other and with the principles of responsible fiscal management as 
set out in the Public Finance Act 1989."115 This bare assertion leaves the reader to 
determine how the fiscal intentions and objectives are consistent with the Act. It 
therefore limits the usefulness of the report as a tool for the public and Parliament to 
assess compliance with the Act. Some of the Treasury's reporting activities were 
emerging practices before the fiscal responsibility provisions were enacted, but their 
enactment has transformed them into legislative requirements. This improves the 
Treasury's robustness by ensuring that it will not be pressured by the government into 
scaling back its reporting. However, as stated, there is no information available on 
whether the Treasury is truly independent in its production of the reports.                                                          
114 Bill English Fiscal Strategy Report (Treasury, 21 May 2015). 
115 At 15. 
Jordan Lipski  LAWS 522 
 
 21 
 
It is also worth noting that the Treasury is a government department subject to the 
Official Information Act 1982 (OIA). Further information on fiscal matters, which is 
not published in reports mandated by the Public Finance Act, could be obtained by an 
OIA request. This legislation enhances the Treasury's effectiveness, by expanding the 
scope of information on fiscal matters available to the public. However, it is helpful in 
theory more than in practice. Making OIA requests can be onerous for individuals. 
Requests are often made by the media. But there do not appear to have been any on 
fiscal policy matters that have been published in articles. 
 
The Treasury is weak from a constitutional perspective, because it is under the 
Minister's direction, does not have inquisitorial powers and cannot issue sanctions 
against the Minister or government. Its reports may lead to political consequences for 
the government, but it is not clear how strong an incentive this is for compliance with 
the Act. From a learning perspective, its reports may highlight weaknesses in the 
government's fiscal and economic strategy. It is worth noting that the Treasury also 
gives economic and fiscal advice to the government. This does not affect the Treasury 
as an accountability forum, but does mean it can influence policy in ways outside the 
scope of the Act-mandated reports. 
 
To summarise, the Treasury does not meet Bovens' definition of an accountability 
forum. It is under the direction of the Minister, so is in fact accountable to the 
Minister, not the other way round. It does nonetheless help provide accountability. It 
publishes reports mandated by the Act, which are made available publicly and tabled 
in Parliament. These reports have the potential to produce political consequences for 
the government. However, key reports are limited and tend to assert, rather than 
explain, compliance with the Act. Overall, the Treasury is a fairly weak provider of 
accountability. It could more appropriately be considered a provider of transparency. 
 
D The Media  
 
Mass media are "by far the most important" source of information about officials' 
activities and decisions,116 representing a necessary condition for the existence of 
democratic government and a pre-condition for accountability. 117  The media can 
"play a key role in enabling citizens – who have imperfect information about 
government activities – to monitor the actions of ministers", which "leads to a 
government that is more accountable and responsive to its citizens and render[s] 
elected politicians more accountable."118 
 
Bovens considers the media to be a form of political accountability,119 although, in 
this context at least, it does not stack up well against his definition of accountability. 
It does not have any power over the Minister, and the Minister is not necessarily 
given the opportunity to explain and justify his or her conduct. The media cannot 
impose formal sanctions, but its actions can result in political consequences for the                                                         
116 R Douglas Arnold Congress, the Press, and Political Accountability (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2004) at 1. 
117 Martino Maggetti "The Media Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies" (2012) 4 
European Political Science Review 385 at 387. 
118 At 387. 
119 Bovens, above n 37, at 455. 
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Minister and government. The positive or negative tone of media coverage is 
significant, and citizens ever more frequently form their political opinions based on 
what they learn from the news media. 120  The 'new media' has also helped with 
accountability: the general availability of real-time information, particularly on 
internet blogs and news websites, increases the public's ability to hold the government 
accountable. It also requires governments to respond more quickly, especially when 
they are making policy or law reform announcements.121 
 
From a democratic perspective, the media could be a very effective forum. It is at 
least a major, if not the main, channel by which the public learns about government 
issues, and the government communicates with the public. The media typically 
reports extensively on budget and general fiscal and economic issues. Although little 
coverage has been given specifically to the reports mandated under the Public Finance 
Act, the content is reported on in more general terms. This provides members of the 
public with information that will help them to make informed decisions and 
democratically constrain the government. From a constitutional perspective, the 
media is less effective. It does not have inquisitorial powers either generally or under 
the Public Finance Act, and it cannot impose sanctions. However, there may be 
political consequences of reporting so the media does provide an incentive to the 
government to behave in a fiscally responsible manner. It is independent, so is not 
formally constrained by the government. 
 
The main weakness of the media, besides its lack of formal power, is that it is 
understandably driven by its own need to attract readers, viewers or listeners, so 
reporting may be sensationalised to achieve this end. Media actors "follow their 
commercial and/or ideological goals… They are indeed involved in the process of 
constructing reality and [they] impose their views on the story."122 As a consequence, 
reporting on fiscal issues tends to be directed towards broken promises, presented in a 
light that focuses on failure, rather than a serious analysis of the more delicate and 
complex issues of fiscal strategy and the principles in the Public Finance Act. For 
example an article on the website www.stuff.co.nz in May 2015 was titled 
"Government will not deliver long promised surplus: Treasury". 123  The article 
included a quote from opposition MP Grant Robertson that the government had 
"staked its economic credibility on" achieving a surplus. Further, reporting may not 
necessarily give the public an accurate impression of the facts. Because of this, it is 
questionable whether the government is incentivised to comply with the Public 
Finance Act, because it might not be criticised by the media unless its actions can be 
presented sensationally. The government could plausibly ignore the Act and fiscal 
responsibility in general as long as it handles the publicity well. New Zealanders tend 
to be less concerned about the economy than citizens of some other countries,124 so 
the media does not have a significant incentive to report on it in detail. 
 
To summarise, the media is an important means by which the public learns of 
government conduct, including fiscal policy. It therefore has significant potential to                                                         
120 Maggetti, above n 117, at 389. 
121 Chen, above n 71, at 39. 
122 Maggetti, above n 117, at 390. 
123 Hamish Rutherford "Government will not deliver long promised surplus: Treasury" (11 May 2015) 
Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>. 
124 See Pete George "Poll – Top 4 Election Issues" (11 March 2014) Your NZ <http://yournz.org>. 
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impose political consequences on the government. However, an important weakness 
is that the media's focus is understandably on attracting readers, viewers or listeners. 
Its reporting therefore tends to be sensationalised, rather than neutral and analytical. 
Further, New Zealanders are relatively apathetic to economic issues, so the media has 
little incentive to make fiscal policy a focus of its reporting. The government might 
minimise any political consequences by handling publicity well. Therefore in practice 
the media is a much less effective accountability forum than it might be in theory. 
 
E The Business Community  
 
Could business groups be considered an accountability forum? Business New Zealand 
is a prominent business union or advocacy group. The New Zealand Initiative (NZI), 
formerly the New Zealand Business Roundtable, is a business-oriented think-tank that 
also engages in public discourse. Neither meets Bovens' definition of an 
accountability forum. They are similar in a sense to the media, but are further 
removed from both the political process and the public, and do not have the same 
privileges that the press does. They have no formal power over the Minister, and the 
Minister is not necessarily given the opportunity to explain the government's decision. 
These issues are similar to those faced by the media, but more marked. The groups 
could nonetheless be effective in holding the government to account. Most relevant is 
the democratic perspective. NZI in particular is frequently cited by the media, and 
regularly produces reports on government policy including fiscal policy.125 This can 
provide an independent perspective on the government's policy, and highlight 
potential issues with it. The organisation's high profile in the media could help it to 
produce political consequences for the government. 
 
There are important limitation. Business New Zealand is a lobby group that represents 
business interests. It is fairly ideological, supporting free enterprise and low business 
taxes, among other things. 126 Similarly, NZI is a think-tank that advocates small 
government and a market-based economy. 127  Having such an agenda arguably 
minimises public credibility and trust. This raises a general point on the relationship 
between ideology and fiscal responsibility. Fiscal responsibility is often associated 
with small-government, libertarian or conservative philosophies. For example, 
Carling and Kirchner, whose work is referred to in this paper, are connected to a 
libertarian think-tank and have also published books and papers arguing for "limited 
government" in Australia.128 (I have accordingly been discerning in citing their work.) 
There is no particular reason why this should be, either generally or in relation to the 
Public Finance Act. Fiscal responsibility is concerned with transparency and balanced 
budgets, not with reducing the size of government per se. I seek to approach the topic 
from a neutral standpoint, and do not seek to advocate any particular ideological 
position. 
 
 
                                                         
125 See for example Bryce Wilkinson and Khyaati Acharya Guarding the Public Purse: Faster Growth, 
Greater Fiscal Discipline (The New Zealand Initiative, 2014). 
126 See Business New Zealand <www.businessnz.org.nz> for more information. 
127 See Pattrick Smellie "Roundtable and NZ Institute morph into new libertarian think tank" (4 April 
2012) National Business Review <www.nbr.co.nz>. 
128 See Carling and Kirchner, above n 2. 
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F Elections  
 
For the sake of thoroughness, could elections themselves be considered an 
accountability forum? No, but they are still a crucial part of accountability in New 
Zealand's fiscal responsibility regime. First, they are the main avenue by which 
sanctions can be imposed on the government – as discussed above, there will not 
likely be any legal sanctions. Secondly, they are therefore a key event around which 
the media, Parliament, the Treasury (which must issue a pre-election update), 
business groups and informal forums such as debates, question and answer sessions, 
and any other campaign events, revolve. The opposition can criticise the government, 
the government must explain and defend its past actions, and the public may have a 
unique chance to interrogate all candidates. Elections therefore provide an opportunity 
to the public to obtain information and give feedback in a way that may not be 
available at other times, even though elections do not come close to meeting Bovens' 
definition. Elections are the ultimate means by which the public imposes 
consequences on the government. When this paper refers to political consequences, 
the main consequence is electoral defeat. In extreme situations pressure for 
resignation may arise, but normally an election is where the consequence is imposed. 
 
G Forums: Interdependence and Conclusion  
 
These accountability forums have been discussed separately because each has its own 
pros and cons. But the effectiveness of each one is heavily dependent on the workings 
of the others. The Treasury may publish its reports and MPs may work to hold the 
government to account through parliamentary criticism. But the political 
consequences of each will be minimal unless the media communicates their efforts to 
the public. Similarly, there is little evidence of penetrating independent reporting by 
the media – it appears to report mainly on what is said in Parliament, and occasionally 
on the Treasury's reports. It also reports on major court cases, including judicial 
review, and gives attention to NZI. Thus without these other forums, the media would 
have little to communicate to the public. Elections are an event around which the 
forums periodically revolve, so significantly increases scrutiny and the opportunity 
for the public to test the government and the opposition. Further, elections provide the 
ultimate political consequence for the government. For analytical purposes the forums 
have been treated discretely in this paper, but it is important to acknowledge their 
interdependency in imposing political consequences on the Minister and government. 
Such consequences do not occur in a vacuum. 
 
V Possible Amendments  
 
This section of the paper considers how New Zealand's fiscal responsibility regime 
could be improved. Three possible amendments are discussed, two of which are 
recommended. The first is the establishment of an independent fiscal commission to 
produce reports currently produced by the Treasury, and provide additional 
commentary on fiscal matters. The second is an amendment to the principles of 
responsible fiscal management to include express reference to intergenerational 
equity. The third amendment, the creation of a numerical target or limit to debt, 
spending or some other measure, is not recommended, primarily on policy grounds. 
The first would be a new accountability forum, while the latter two would simply alter 
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the Act to enhance existing accountability relationships. Each amendment will now be 
discussed in turn. 
 
A Independent Body  
 
In 2012 the Treasury considered whether an independent fiscal council should be 
established to provide commentary on fiscal policy. The Treasury concluded that 
although the council would likely produce a net benefit, it was insufficient to achieve 
specific goals the Treasury was aiming for at that time.129 Accordingly, none has been 
established. 
 
Other models for an independent body have been proposed in Australia. One such 
model is a more substantial fiscal commission. It would be part of a stronger 
enforcement regime that could impose pecuniary penalties on members of the 
Australian federal parliament for breaches of fiscal rules.130 In reality, the pecuniary 
penalty would probably be less significant than the loss of political reputation that 
would come from the imposition of such penalties by an independent commission.131 
The commission would be independently resourced, with commissioners serving five-
year terms with staggered initial appointments.132 The commission would set fiscal 
policy rules, and any government policy decisions would be required to comply with 
those rules.133 The commission would also become the agency required to prepare key 
reports, currently prepared by the Australian Treasury.134 
 
A similar agency in New Zealand might provide real advantages, as a more clearly 
independent check on the executive. While the Treasury must at present prepare 
certain independent reports under the Act, there could be issues of perception about 
its independence. Concern has been expressed that fiscal statements in Australia "are 
often seen as lacking credibility because of a perception that [its] Treasury is overly 
beholden to the executive." Notably in a May 2009 poll 84 per cent of respondents 
said they did not trust Treasury forecasts.135 The Australian Treasury has also been 
accused of changing its forecast assumptions, presentation and methodology to suit 
the government's priorities. 136  While similar polling data is unavailable in New 
Zealand, and no such accusations appear to have been leveled against the New 
Zealand Treasury, it is still possible this perception could exist and undermine 
confidence in the reports. Reports prepared by a genuinely independent agency 
outside the purview of the Minister of Finance might be more credible than those 
prepared by the Treasury. Whether the commission should have the power to impose 
financial penalties on government ministers personally for failure to comply with 
fiscal responsibility provisions, as suggested in Australia, is questionable. The 
absence of penalties contrasts with the serious consequences imposed on company 
directors for failure to comply with accounting standards, including the submission of                                                         
129 Treasury, above n 4, at 9. 
130 Stephen Kirchner "Reforming Fiscal Responsibility Legislation" (2011) 30 Economic Papers 29 at 
32. 
131 At 32. 
132 Carling and Kirchner, above n 2, at 10–11. 
133 At 11. 
134 At 11. 
135 At 3–4. 
136 At 4. 
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certain reports.137 However, this contrast is arguably justifiable because economic 
policy is made by elected representatives and is inherently political, so it ought to be 
enforced politically. On the other hand, it is understandable that certain standards 
should be imposed on company directors, who are private individuals with fiduciary 
obligations to the company and at times its various stakeholders. Including sanctions 
might raise issues because of the broadness and ambiguity of some important terms in 
the Act, and their openness to interpretation. Sanctions would be reasonable only if 
there was a much clearer benchmark against which the actions of the government 
could be assessed – for example if a numerical target were included, then this could 
accompany it. And presumably if penalties could be imposed by the commission, the 
courts might at some stage become involved. As discussed already, the courts will 
probably be reluctant to consider legislation like the Public Finance Act. 
 
Using Bovens' framework, how good would an independent body or commission like 
this be? From a democratic perspective, its independence would give greater 
credibility to the reports that are currently provided by the Treasury. If it were to also 
publish commentary that provides the public with fiscal information in an accessible 
and understandable manner, rather than the more technical and 'government-speak' 
nature of the reports currently produced under the Act, this may help the public to 
make more informed choices and so enhance accountability from a democratic 
perspective. If the body had inquisitorial powers, and could examine the Minister and 
any other relevant individual, then it would be strong from a constitutional 
perspective. This would be improved further if the body could impose penalties on the 
Minister, as it would provide a more solid incentive to comply with the legislation. 
But, as discussed above, imposing penalties would likely require more substantive 
changes to the legislative regime. However, if it has actual sanctioning power then it 
would be weaker from a democratic perspective – it would essentially restrict the 
exercise of democratic political judgment. So there is a tension between being strong 
from a constitutional perspective and weak (or even negative) from a democratic 
perspective. 
 
It is worth noting that powers given to such a commission must be linked to 
provisions to ensure the commission itself is accountable. Scholars have considered 
that independent regulatory agencies, which operate outside democratic institutions, 
need a "multi-pronged system of controls" to keep them accountable.138 The control 
mechanisms that might be necessary are: (1) specification of clear and narrow 
objectives, rather than broad and ambiguous ones; (2) oversight by governmental and 
parliamentary committees; (3) procedural requirements like hearings and reporting 
duties; (4) judicial review; (5) professionalism and peer review; and (6) transparency 
and public participation. An active media would also be of help,139 but that cannot be 
controlled. Such mechanisms might work well for the commission, particularly if it 
has sanctioning power. The exception would be (2), because oversight by 
governmental and parliamentary committees would be problematic for a fiscal 
responsibility commission, since its object would be to oversee the government. 
                                                         
137 Graeme Wines and Helen Scarborough "Behind the Headlines: An Analysis of Australian 
Commonwealth, State and Territory Budget Balance Numbers" (2006) 12(2) Accounting, 
Accountability & Performance 82 at 109. 
138 See Maggetti, above n 117, at 386. 
139 At 387–388. 
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B Intergenerational Equity  
 
New Zealand's population is ageing. It is expected that by 2061, between 22 and 30 
per cent of New Zealanders will be aged over 65, compared to 14 per cent in 2012.140 
This means there will be fewer working age people (taxpayers, essentially) per person 
over 65 to pay for the costs of government. 
 
An ageing population causes long-term fiscal concerns, because of the extra cost of 
superannuation and healthcare, among other things. Including generational equity in 
fiscal responsibility legislation is important because "as the cost is shifted to future 
generations, the current governments obviously cannot be held accountable." 141  
Intergenerational equity refers to the maintenance of living standards. It more 
concretely requires that "the cost of public expenditures should be distributed over 
time in a way that reflects the inter-temporal spread of the benefits generated by those 
expenditures".142 An important part of this is that taxpayers in each period should, as 
a group, contribute to public expenditures from which they derive benefits in 
accordance with the share of the benefits they receive. In other words, they should 
'pay their way' without either subsidising or being subsidised by taxpayers in other 
time periods. 143  Besides demographic changes, climate change and other 
environmental problems may also result in significant costs to future generations.144 
Fiscal strategy reports in some other jurisdictions include discussion of climate 
change as it relates to fiscal policy and intergenerational concerns,145 and this might 
be well worth including in New Zealand. 
 
The Public Finance Act's principle relating to generational concerns is: "when 
formulating fiscal strategy, having regard to its likely impact on present and future 
generations".146 This wording does not preclude considerations of intergenerational 
equity. But similar wording in an equivalent Australian Act has been applied in a way 
concerned with fiscal sustainability across generations, rather than intergenerational 
equity.147 Thus it is entirely possible that the New Zealand government will ignore 
matters of equity and focus on fiscal sustainability.148 The principle was added in the 
2013 Amendment, so the way it is applied in practice is still developing. But so far 
references to intergenerational equity have been minimal, and general in nature. An 
explicit reference in the legislation to considering intergenerational equity would be 
advantageous to future generations. 
 
                                                        
140 Statistics New Zealand How will New Zealand's ageing population affect the property market? 
(April 2013) at 6. 
141 Greg Coombs and Brian Dollery "The Ageing of Australia: Fiscal Sustainability, Intergenerational 
Equity and Inter-Temporal Fiscal Balance" (2004) 39 Australian Journal of Social Sciences 459 at 464. 
142 At 467. 
143 At 467. 
144 See Barry Anderson and James Sheppard "Fiscal Futures, Institutional Budget Reforms, and Their 
Effects: What Can Be Learned?" (2009) 9(3) OECD Journal on Budgeting 7. 
145 For example Australia and Denmark. 
146 Section 26G(1)(g). 
147 Judith C Bessant, Michael Emslie and Rob Watts "Accounting for Future Generations: 
Intergenerational Equity in Australia" (2011) 70 Australian Journal of Public Administration 143 at 
146. 
148 Fiscal sustainability is concerned merely with whether spending can be sustained in the long run. 
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How would it perform under Bovens' framework? It would add another dimension to 
the fiscal strategy and therefore the reports mandated by the Act. The public would be 
able to see more clearly the long-term implications of fiscal strategy, and whether 
some generations are effectively subsidising others – for example, if current fiscal 
policy is shifting financial burdens to today's children in the future. This will enhance 
the public's ability to make informed choices and voice reasoned opinions on issues of 
fiscal strategy. Thus democratic accountability would be improved. There may be 
benefits from a learning perspective, because it would highlight a different way of 
thinking about fiscal policy. It might lead to a departure from the normal focus of 
economic growth and fiscal sustainability, in favour of a more holistic and fairness –
even long-term wellbeing-oriented – focus. Western countries' fixation with economic 
growth has been criticised,149 so including a principle like this may have the added 
benefit of helping to move away from that focus. This amendment is therefore 
recommended. 
 
C Numerical Target or Limit  
 
The Treasury opposed adding to the Act a new principle that imposes a numerical 
limit or target for certain financial variables,150 such as spending increases or debt. 
Under the system contemplated by the Treasury, the government could depart from 
the limit temporarily, provided the Minister explains the reason for the departure, the 
approach the government intends to take to return to the limit, and the period of time 
the government expects to take to return to the limit. The amendment might also 
include corresponding requirements that the spending limit for the coming financial 
year be announced in the Budget Policy Statement, and a requirement that the 
Minister of Finance explain in the Statement whether expenses for the past year 
remained within the spending limit for that year. 
 
Using Bovens' framework, how would a fixed target or limit improve accountability? 
It would in a sense get around some ambiguities in the legislation, like "prudent" level 
of debt. This is because there would be a number value against which the 
government's fiscal performance can be measured. It would therefore provide the 
public with a clearer and more understandable assessment of the government's fiscal 
responsibility. Because of this clear benchmark, which would be understandable to 
the public, the media might be more inclined to give attention to it. The government 
would have no discretion over interpretation, and would be less able to use political 
rhetoric to 'spin' its fiscal decisions and obscure their true nature. It has been argued 
that similar Australian principles are "too general and open to interpretation to 
provide an effective constraint on the conduct of fiscal policy".151 The same could be 
said of New Zealand's Act, so firm limits or targets would rectify this issue. It may 
help the public to better evaluate the government's actions and make more informed 
demands either to the government directly or at the ballot box. 
 
From a constitutional perspective there would be little substantive change. Enacting a 
fixed target or limit in legislation might increase the appearance of separation of                                                         
149 For example see Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi (eds) Report by the 
Commission on the Measurement and Economic Performance and Social Progress (French 
Government, September 2009). 
150 Treasury, above n 4, at 15–18. 
151 Carling and Kirchner, above n 2, at 6. 
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powers and thus enhance Parliament's control over the executive. But in reality the 
fusion of the legislative and executive branches means the government could simply 
amend or repeal the legislation. If the legislation is not entrenched, then a simple 
majority using the normal legislative process would be capable of freeing the 
government from the limit. Further, the legislation still would not be enforceable by 
the courts, if the discussion above is correct, so the target would have no teeth. 
 
The Act is a very policy-driven piece of legislation, and the addition of a fixed target 
would have distinct advantages and disadvantages from a policy perspective. The 
advantages are, first, that it prevents increases in spending that might be tempting to 
the government in the event that tax revenue is higher than expected. Secondly, it 
helps drive productivity and efficiency gains in the state sector. And thirdly, it avoids 
pro-cyclical152 fiscal policy in an upturn (such as increasing spending for political 
gain – for example election sweetener spending on highly visible projects – if tax 
revenue increases due to strong economic conditions).153 The major disadvantage is 
that its inherent inflexibility may prevent the government from pursuing targeted and 
short-term counter-cyclical fiscal policy, such as a stimulus package to minimise the 
effects of a recession. 154 The absence of a numerical target in the Act has been 
praised: "[b]y not imposing specific numerical targets in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
[as it then was], New Zealand's multi-year budgeting process affords greater policy 
flexibility for the government to respond to changes in general economic 
conditions."155 For example the legislation has enabled the government to make rapid 
adjustments to fiscal policy to alleviate the effects of a severe drought and the Asian 
economic crises of 1998.156 A more recent scenario is the government's response to 
the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, after which debt was permitted to increase 
substantially due to reduced tax revenue and an increase in spending. A limit may 
impede such action. An allowance for short-term departures from the limit may be 
insufficient. Some recessions 157  are prolonged, and good economic policy may 
require the government to run deficits for a decade or more. An issue from both a 
policy and an accountability perspective is that it would increase the incentives on the 
government to find less transparent ways of spending, in order to circumvent the 
limit.158 The consequence is that accountability and transparency could be worse than 
they are under the current legislation. The current broad and ambiguous language 
does at least minimise the government's incentive to reduce transparency. 
 
The select committee considering the original Fiscal Responsibility Bill explicitly 
considered the role of mandatory targets, but rejected their inclusion for several 
reasons. 159  Some are in substance similar to those discussed above, so are not 
repeated here. But two are different from those already discussed. First, there is no                                                         
152 Pro-cyclical fiscal policy reinforces the economic cycle. Its effects may be, for example, to worsen a 
recession or inflate a bubble. Economists often argue for counter-cyclical policy to minimise economic 
cycles, in order to stabilise the economy. 
153 Treasury, above n 4, at 16–17. 
154 At 17. 
155 LF Jameson Boex, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Robert M McNab "Multi-Year Budgeting: A 
Review of International Practices and Lessons for Developing and Transitioning Economies" (2002) 
20(2) Public Budgeting & Finance 91 at 101. 
156 At 101, footnote 19. 
157 As noted, recessions are essentially contractions in the economy. 
158 Treasury, above n 4, at 17. 
159 Janssen, above n 19, at 8. 
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theoretical justification for any particular fiscal target that can be maintained over a 
period of time. Judgments on the appropriate level of spending vary over time and 
depend on the country's economic circumstances at the relevant time. Secondly, other 
countries' experience of legislated targets suggests there are substantial risks attached 
to their use. Rigid adherence to targets can distort decision making, while lack of 
adherence – even a minor variation from the target – can significantly damage 
credibility. 
 
In fact, this type of constraint has already been tried in New Zealand in the early 
2000s, and was far from successful: "[e]fforts to restrict likely spending pressures saw 
the introduction of a mechanism known as 'fiscal provisioning,' essentially a pre-
stated and fixed limit on total new spending over the parliamentary term of three 
years. This has proved to be a difficult instrument to manage politically. During the 
second cycle of operation, most of this money was spent during the first two years of 
government and the framework proved incapable of limiting the spending intentions 
of a coalition government facing six consecutive budget surpluses and an impending 
election." 160  The failure led the Treasury to introduce a new fiscal management 
approach that allowed for more fiscal flexibility.161 One key difference is that there 
was no legislation mandating the "fiscal provisioning" cycles. The first limit, $5.9 
billion in new operating spending during the following three years, was self-imposed 
during the 2000 campaign.162 There is a difference politically between complying 
with existing, albeit unenforceable, legislation and creating self-imposed non-legal 
constraints. So more commitment might be expected if the limit was prescribed in 
legislation. Nonetheless, the ineffectiveness of the past experiment does suggest that 
governments would not take a limit seriously – which is arguably good from an 
economic policy perspective, but defeats the purpose of the limit. 
 
Therefore, this change is not recommended. The disadvantages discussed above are 
significant, and there would be a risk the legislation may simply be ignored or 
changed of it lacks widespread support. Because of the importance of fiscal policy to 
the economy and thus all New Zealanders, policy implications are extremely 
important in this area of the law. Essentially, this is a situation where there is a 
tension between accountability and workability which in my view comes down 
strongly in favour of workability. 
 
D Conclusion on Amendments  
 
Thus it is recommended that an independent fiscal body be established, and the Act's 
principle relating to intergenerational concerns explicitly refer to intergenerational 
equity. Each of these has benefits for accountability, and is good policy. A numerical 
target or limit is not recommended, because it likely would be ineffective. And if it 
was to prove effective it may undesirably constrain economic policy. 
 
 
                                                         
160 Irene S Rubin and Joanne Kelly "Budget and Accounting Reforms" in Ewan Ferlie, Laurence E 
Lynn Jr and Christopher Pollitt (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Public Management (OUP, Oxford, 
2009) at 570. 
161 At 570. 
162 OECD Reallocation: The Role of Budget Institutions (2005) at 18. 
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VI Conclusion  
 
The fiscal responsibility provisions of the Public Finance Act are an important part of 
New Zealand's government finance legislation. The increased transparency led the 
provisions as seen as world-leading when they were first enacted. However they are 
unlikely to be directly enforced by the courts. Further, some important terms in the 
legislation are undefined, leaving the government with the discretion to interpret those 
terms as it likes. Using Bovens' framework for assessing accountability, the 
legislation performs acceptably in some respects. Obligations are imposed by the 
legislation, and can be pressed by Parliament, a political forum. But the lack of legal 
accountability and legal consequences weakens the regime. Overall, the main 
accountability forums considered in this paper – Parliament, the courts, the Treasury 
and the media – are limited. They have the potential to impose significant political 
consequences on the government, but in practice do not. 
 
The regime could be improved by the establishment of an independent commission to 
oversee fiscal policy, provide commentary, and prepare Act-mandated reports that are 
currently prepared by the Treasury. Another recommendation is that the principle of 
responsible fiscal management relating to intergenerational concerns be amended to 
expressly include consideration of intergenerational equity. International experience 
suggests that intergenerational concerns are focussed on long-term fiscal 
sustainability, to the exclusion of equity issues. New Zealand's ageing population will 
put pressure on future generations, as will other emerging issues including climate 
change. A legislative amendment to include numerical limits or targets is not 
recommended, primarily on policy grounds. It is important for the government to 
have a degree of flexibility when setting economic policy, and be able to respond 
effectively to economic shocks, natural disasters, and other such pressures. Further, 
such an amendment would increase incentives on the government to find less 
transparent ways of spending. 
 
Could Bovens' approach be too narrow and rigid? Does the mere process in the Public 
Finance Act not add something – control, trust, an assumption of good outcomes 
because the public knows the government is taking the provisions into account? Some 
other formulation may suit the Act and fiscal responsibility better. The foregoing 
analysis indicates there is weak accountability surrounding the Act and fiscal 
responsibility in general. But this may not a problem for the regime – although it 
could be improved by the recommendations above – but rather shows that 
accountability is not the best framework to use for major, high-level policy decisions 
such as fiscal strategy. It is arguably better suited to more routine and operational 
decisions and actions. For example, the decisions of an independent regulatory agency 
might be well suited to the application of Bovens' accountability framework. Olsen 
suggests that accountability analysis can be used for political issues. 163 He says the 
task is to discover and possibly punish noncompliance, for example by investigations 
into whether public funds are spent as intended and laws are followed. He considers it 
important to analyse where accountability regimes come from, how they are 
maintained and changed, and how accountability processes feed back into                                                         
163 Johan P Olsen "Democratic Order, Autonomy, and Accountability" (2015) 28 Governance at 2 
(upcoming issue; journal page number not known). 
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accountability regimes and political orders.164 Perhaps Olsen's view is based on lower 
standards; accountability as he describes it might not perform well under Bovens' 
framework, yet still in a sense constitute accountability. 
 
Brandsma and Schillemans emphasise that the question whether an accountability 
deficit is normatively problematic is a different matter from the measurement and 
analysis of accountability. The answer depends on one's view of good governance, 
whereas the accountability framework is evaluative and is not itself a normative 
tool. 165  In the case of the Public Finance Act the weakness probably is not 
normatively problematic, given the policy-driven nature of this legislation. Further, 
too much accountability can also be undesirable: "[a]ccountability is conceived as a 
precondition for democratic government, but accountability overload is seen to reduce 
performance and erode public trust in democratic government."166 
 
The relationship between accountability and transparency is unclear and contentious. 
The Public Finance Act might be better thought of as an aide to transparency rather 
than accountability. Transparency broadly means "the conduct of business in a 
fashion that makes decisions, rules and other information visible from outside."167 
The Act essentially imposes mandatory considerations on the government when 
determining fiscal strategy, and mandates the public reporting of that strategy against 
those requirements. This certainly increases transparency because the public knows 
that particular principles underpin fiscal policy, and also learns from the reports 
whether the government's strategy is consistent with those principles. This 
transparency builds trust in the government even if there is no firm mechanism to 
hold the government accountable for fiscal responsibility. 
 
As already mentioned, Bovens considers transparency to be a prerequisite for 
accountability, but not in itself sufficient due to the lack scrutiny by a specific 
forum.168 Hood outlines three prominent characterisations of the relationship between 
accountability and transparency. 169  The first is a "Siamese twin" interpretation: 
accountability and transparency are considered to be inextricably intertwined to the 
point where they cannot meaningfully be distinguished as different things. This view 
is problematic because transparency in the general sense of disclosure to the public 
need not be present in order for accountability to exist. For example, civil servants 
may be held accountable to Ministers without the details of their activities being 
available publicly. 170  And as Bovens notes, there can be transparency without 
accountability. The second interpretation is that accountability and transparency are 
"matching parts": they are separable but complementary because they produce good 
governance only in combination, not independently.171 For example, transparency in 
the general sense of disclosure of information about government affairs provides the 
necessary material for democratic accountability.172 This is approximately the view                                                         
164 Olsen, above n 163, at 2 (upcoming issue; journal page number not known). 
165 Brandsma and Schillemans, above n 39, at 961. 
166 Olsen, above n 163, at 1. 
167 Christopher Hood "Accountability and Transparency: Siamese Twins, Matching Parts, Awkward 
Couple?" (2010) 33 West European Politics 989 at 989. 
168 Bovens, above n 37, at 453. 
169 Hood, above n 167. 
170 At 990–991. 
171 At 990. 
172 At 992. 
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that Bovens has espoused. However, there is again the difficulty that such general 
transparency need not be present for accountability to exist and be effective. The third 
interpretation is that transparency and accountability are an "awkward couple": they 
involve elements that are not only separable but actually may not always combine to 
produce good governance, and there may even be a tension and trade-off between the 
two.173 Proponents of this view argue that formal transparency requirements tend to 
lead to low-intelligence, defensive box-ticking and one-way communication rather 
than real answerability in effective dialogue.174 Although this view may be seen as an 
occasional aberration rather than a widely applicable interpretation, it should not be 
dismissed.175 
 
In the context of fiscal responsibility and the Public Finance Act, the "awkward 
couple" conception might in fact be most accurate, because overly firm accountability 
could lead to bad policy. This point is made several times in this paper (especially 
when discussing the courts, and an amendment to include a numerical target). So 
leaving weak accountability but with an emphasis on transparency, as the Act 
essentially does, is the best way to achieve good fiscal governance: providing the 
policy flexibility to meet economic challenges, but with transparency and relatively 
soft, political accountability. The fiscal responsibility regime is a good middle ground 
between two extremes: a lack of formal accountability or transparency arrangements 
at one end, and firm constraints on fiscal policy at the other.176 
 
Thus it is arguable that accountability analysis does not fully recognise the value in 
legislation like the Public Finance Act, and the Act is better thought of as an aide to 
transparency than accountability. It is also an instance in which, due to policy 
considerations, the so-called "awkward couple" conceptualisation of the relationship 
between accountability and transparency might be apt: too much of them might 
constrain good governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
173 Hood, above n 167, at 990. 
174 See Hood, above n 167, at 992. 
175 At 993. 
176 While writing this paper I began to see an analogy with New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(BORA). BORA combines pre-enactment rights review with weak-form judicial review. Parliamentary 
sovereignty remains, but in a weakened form. Moreover, BORA's procedures may assist the political 
enforcement of its rights. Gardbaum argues that such a constitutional structure is a "normatively 
appealing" middle ground between straight legislative supremacy and judicial supremacy. See Stephen 
Gardbaum "The Case for the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism" (2013) 14 German LJ 
2229. I regard New Zealand's fiscal responsibility regime similarly. Further discussion on this point is 
outside the scope of this paper. 
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